Real Madrid vs Alaves: Tactical Analysis of 2-1 Victory
Real Madrid edged a structurally complex contest 2–1 against Alaves at Estadio Santiago Bernabéu, a match where the tactical storyline diverged from the raw scoreline and even from the underlying chance quality. In a La Liga regular season fixture that finished 2–1 on the night, the hosts imposed territorial and possession control through a 4-4-2, but Alaves’ 5-3-2 block, plus their late attacking reshapes, generated an xG edge (1.76 to 1.62) and a nervy finale that the score alone does not fully reveal.
First Half
The opening goal at 30' came from a classic Real Madrid pattern: Kylian Mbappé attacking the last line off the right half-space service of Arda Güler. With Real settled in a 4-4-2, Güler starting as a right-sided midfielder but operating as an interior playmaker, the move underlined how the nominal wide player repeatedly stepped into the right half-space to connect midfield and attack. Mbappé’s finish gave Real a 1–0 lead that reflected their territorial dominance but not yet a clear margin in shot quality.
At 35', Aurélien Tchouaméni’s yellow card for a foul was tactically significant. Up to that point he had been the single pivot in front of the Éder Militão–Dean Huijsen pairing, aggressive in stepping into midfield duels. The booking forced him into more conservative positioning, slightly increasing the distances between Real’s midfield and front line and giving Alaves more room to circulate in front of the block.
Just before the interval at 45+2', Éder Militão (OUT) was replaced by Antonio Rüdiger (IN). This was a like-for-like swap in terms of role—right-sided centre-back—but with a different defensive profile. Rüdiger’s more front-foot, dueling-oriented style allowed Real to defend higher and more aggressively in the second half, particularly against direct balls toward Lucas Boyé and Toni Martínez.
Second Half
Real doubled their lead at 50' through Vinicius Júnior, assisted by Federico Valverde. The pattern again emphasized Real’s wide-to-inside dynamics: Valverde, nominally the right-sided midfielder, attacked the half-space and delivered into Vinicius attacking the far channel. At 2–0, Real’s structure seemed fully in control, but the underlying xG remained tight, reflecting Alaves’ capacity to create decent looks when they did break through.
The 58' triple substitution window was the tactical hinge of the game. For Real Madrid, Arda Güler (OUT) was replaced by Franco Mastantuono (IN), and Jude Bellingham (OUT) made way for Brahim Díaz (IN). Simultaneously, Alaves introduced Carles Aleñá (IN) for Jon Guridi (OUT) and Pablo Ibáñez (IN) for Denis Suárez (OUT).
For Real, the double change shifted the nature of their central occupation. With Bellingham off, they lost a high-volume ball-carrier and late box runner; Brahim offered more dribbling between the lines but less aerial and physical presence. Mastantuono, coming in for Güler, kept the right-side creative role but with a more vertical, dribble-first profile. The net effect was to make Real’s attacks more transition-oriented and less about stable positional circulation.
For Alaves, Aleñá and Ibáñez injected more progressive passing and energy into midfield. Guridi had been the main connector in the central three; Aleñá’s introduction tilted the team toward more risk in possession, with sharper vertical passes into the front two. Ibáñez, for Denis Suárez, raised the work-rate and pressing intensity, helping Alaves contest second balls more effectively.
At 63', Real made a defensive-structural adjustment: Trent Alexander-Arnold (OUT) was replaced by Dani Carvajal (IN), and Tchouaméni (OUT) by Eduardo Camavinga (IN). Carvajal’s entry on the right brought more conservative, line-protecting full-back play compared with Alexander-Arnold’s playmaking tendencies. This subtly rebalanced Real’s rest defence, prioritizing stability over right-side creativity. Camavinga at the base of midfield added ball-carrying from deep and better coverage of large spaces, which was critical as Alaves began to commit more numbers forward.
Alaves responded at 66' with a double attacking change: Lucas Boyé (OUT) was replaced by Ibrahim Diabaté (IN), and Youssef Enriquez Lekhedim “Yusi” (OUT) by Calebe Gonçalves (IN). The latter change effectively refreshed the left side of the back five, giving Alaves more athleticism and willingness to step into midfield on that flank. Diabaté, meanwhile, offered more depth runs than Boyé, stretching Real’s back line and forcing Rüdiger and Huijsen to defend larger vertical spaces.
The final Alaves midfield shift came at 75', when Antonio Blanco (OUT) was replaced by Ander Guevara (IN). Blanco had anchored the midfield three; Guevara’s entry maintained the single-pivot structure but with a slightly more dynamic, pressing-oriented profile. This allowed Aleñá and Ibáñez to push higher, effectively morphing Alaves’ 5-3-2 into a situational 3-4-1-2 in possession, with wing-backs stepping out and one central midfielder joining the forwards between Real’s lines.
Disciplinarily, the second half remained largely controlled until 90', when Ángel Pérez received a yellow card for a foul. This was emblematic of Alaves’ late-game aggression as they chased a way back into the match, often leaving their wide centre-backs and wing-backs in high, risky duels.
The payoff for that structural boldness came almost immediately at 90', when Toni Martínez scored for Alaves, assisted by Ander Guevara. The goal encapsulated Alaves’ late shape: Guevara stepping higher from the pivot zone to link play, and Martínez exploiting the channels between full-back and centre-back. It reduced the deficit to 2–1 and aligned more closely with the xG profile, which had Alaves narrowly ahead in expected goals.
From a statistical standpoint, Real Madrid’s 61% possession and 631 total passes (90% accuracy) confirm their dominance of the ball and territory. Their 24 total shots, with 8 on target, point to sustained pressure but also some inefficiency, especially given an xG of 1.62 that yielded two goals—slightly outperforming the model. Defensively, Andriy Lunin recorded 4 saves, but with a negative goals-prevented value of -1, suggesting that the quality of Alaves’ chances marginally exceeded what the shot-stopping delivered.
Alaves, with 39% possession and 399 passes (83% accuracy), played a more direct, vertically inclined game. Their 19 shots, 5 on target, and xG of 1.76 underline that their attacking sequences, though fewer, were often of high quality. Antonio Sivera’s 5 saves, combined with the same -1 goals-prevented metric, indicate that Real’s finishing also slightly outpaced expected outcomes.
Card totals were balanced—one yellow per side (Tchouaméni 35', Ángel Pérez 90')—and did not materially distort the tactical narrative. Overall, the statistical verdict supports a reading of Real Madrid as structurally dominant but vulnerable to vertical, late-game surges, while Alaves emerge as a side whose compact 5-3-2 and smart in-game adjustments can manufacture high-quality chances even under sustained territorial pressure.




